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Abstract
Risk management and asset pricing benefit from simple functional descriptions of the distribu-
tion of real asset returns. Recently, several authors have proposed that asset returns in real
stock markets are distributed according to a hyperbolic distribution. While asset returns are
generated by trades over time, the natural question is: What does economic theory imply con-
cerning return distributions? We propose a simple model of price formation and, thus, return
distribution which is based on economic reasoning. The markets behavior is represented by a
pair consisting of a time-constant strategy and a dynamical trading strategy generating a flow
between funds. Simulations of the price dynamics generate returns with fat-tail behavior in line
with that of a hyperbolic distribution, and also volatility clustering, which is a mayor stylized
fact of asset returns.
Keywords: Asset returns, hyperbolic distribution, evolutionary finance
JEL numbers: G12, C51
1 Introduction
Prices are observable entities of a financial market. With a view towards risk management and
asset pricing, numerous distributions to model the returns have been proposed. For a broad
overview over this topic see the monograph by Bouchard and Potters (2000). Among others,
such as ease of computation and estimation, the value of a proposed distribution is related to the
degree to which it fits to the data. Having found a good distribution, the next question is: Which
stochastic process generates this distribution? This stochastic process is then taken as the model
for the process under consideration. This model is purely descriptive rather than explanatory.
Barndorff-Nielsen (1977) introduced the family of (generalized) hyperbolic distributions. While
his original concern was the particle size distribution in certain transport phenomena, several
authors including Barndorff-Nielse, Eberlein and Keller, and Bibby and Sørensen used this family
of distributions successfully for modelling stock prices. For an overview about diffusion models
generating (generalized) hyperbolic densities, see Bibby and Sørensen (1997) and Sørensen (2003)
and the references therein. Prices are generated during trades between agents on the financial
market. Therefore the distribution of asset returns should be deducible from economic reasoning,
if one would know the mechanism by which prices are generated over time. The problem here is
that there is not a unique, well-established, and agreed model for price formation. Apart from
its details, (mainstream) theoretical economics seems to at least agree that the price process is
a multiplicative random walk, in which the multiplicative factor is a random variable, see Duffie
(2001). Details of the distribution of this random variable are left to specific modelling and
speculation. The aim of this note is not to propose some functional form of a price distribution
that fits real data, but rather to deduce a distribution of (log-) returns from an elementary
model that takes into traders’ actions on the market.
2 On the hyperbolic distribution
To fix notation: Given the price trail Q(t) of an asset its (log) return is defined as
S(t,∆t) := log Q(t + ∆t)− log Q(t), ∆t > 0
while the absolute return is |S(t,∆t)|. The distribution of returns is defined by
P∆t(Z) = Pr[ S(t,∆t) = Z ].
(For finite trails lengths, P is actually the relative frequency.) With respect to tail behavior it is
worthwhile to consider the semi-logarithmic plot of the distribution (Z, lnP (Z)). The distribu-
tion P∆t of returns S(t,∆t) is non-Gaussian, in that it is more sharply peaked than the normal
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distribution, while its tails are more heavy; see Figure 1. There is no consensus about which
distribution fits financial return data best. Various parametric models have been discussed in
the literature, see Cont (2001) and the references therein.
Figure 1: Histogram of return distribution for daily returns
of the DJIA from 1966 - 1989. Solid lines represent different
Normal distributions.
In a semi-logarithmic plot, the return distribution looks triangular rather than parabolic, see
Figure 1. This finding supports the conjecture by Madan and Senata (1990) that the observed
return distribution belongs to the family of hyperbolic distributions. Stronger evidence from
data is discussed later. Roughly speaking, a hyperbolic distribution is characterized by the fact
that the logarithm of its density forms a hyperbola. The density of the hyperbolic distribution
P (x) = P (x; p, q, δ, µ) is such that
lnP (x) ∼ const− p
√
δ2 + (x− µ)2 + q(x− µ)
with four parameters denoted by (p, q, δ, µ), where µ ∈ R and 0 < δ ∈ R serve as location and
scale, respectively, and p, q are the shape parameters of the distribution. The range of the shape
parameters is a triangle
∆ = {(p, q) ∈ R2 : 0 ≤ |q| < p < 1}.
Hence, any hyperbolic distribution can be uniquely represented by a point (p, q) ∈ ∆; see Figure
2. This family includes the normal and the (possibly) skew Laplace distribution, particularly
in the limit p → 0, the distribution approaches the normal density, while for (1, 0) it coincides
with the (location-scale) Laplace. Further details about generalized hyperbolic distribution can
be found in Eberlein and Prause (2002) and Sørensen (2003) and will be omitted here.
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Figure 2: Hyperbolic log densities with
mean 0 and variance 1 for different pa-
rameter values of p and q, from Bibby and
Sørensen (1997)
q
Figure 3: Shape triangle: Estimated pa-
rameters for several stocks, see Ku¨cher et
al. (1999). The region of estimated pa-
rameters is narrow.
Madan and Seneta (1990) proposed that the distribution of asset returns is hyperbolic. Eber-
lein and Prause (2002) and also Ku¨cher et al. (1999) estimated the two shape parameters of
the hyperbolic distributions for a number of asset returns and found that these parameters lie
in a quite narrow region close to q = 0, see Figure 3. In fact the estimated values of q are
only slightly larger than 0 and, hence the distribution is slightly skew due to a small trend in
weekly data and, more interestingly, the estimated range for p is [0.6, 1]. This corresponds to
the fact that returns are non-Gaussian (p  0), but are roughly triangular, i.e., their shape –
in a logarithmic plot – ranges ranges from a tent with a sharp central edge (p = 1) to a ”soft”
tent with a smooth central edge (p < 1). Hence, the data seem to support the conjecture that
asset returns are hyperbolic.
The conjecture by Madan and Seneta was purely data driven and has no economic ex-
planatory component. Our question is whether this conjecture can be justified from economic
reasoning. We propose a model from traditional finance (see Blume and Easley (1992) and also
Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2002)), in which prices are generated by trades between
agents on the market. The set of market participants is partitioned into classes in which all
investors share the same strategy. An agent is a representative of the strategy class to which
it belongs. Different agents compete for money income, measured as the relative market share
of the agent. Generally, a strategy is a mixture of basic investment rules. This mixture can
vary in time, i.e., during time, an agent may change his partitioning of relative wealth among
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different investment styles (funds). This decision is thought to depend on some economic trig-
ger. This creates a flow of funds for each agent. We consider the following situation: An agent
faces a market – thereby the agent follows a dynamical strategy while the market’s behavior
is represented by a time-constant strategy. This accounts for the fact that an individual agent
may change its strategy more rapidly than the market’ aggregate of strategy mixtures changes.
3 The fundamental economic model of wealth dynamics
In this section, we propose an elementary model for endogenous price formation by trade, based
on Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hopp (2002). The most fundamental idea is the following: A
financial market is established by a huge number of traders, such as individuals and institutional
investors. This collection is partitioned into a set of trading strategies, each strategy representing
the set of all investors following that strategy. A trading strategy consists of two settings: one
is the investment style and the other one is called the allocation style. The investment style
determines the amount of wealth that is spent on the financial market, while the allocation style
determines how much of this invested wealth is spent across assets. In the following, we assume
that all investors have the same investment style. Trades, i.e. re-allocation of resources, can be
regarded as the result of an interaction between trading strategies. Thus the strength of these
interactions reflects the relative impacts of competing strategies. The more wealth a strategy
has collected during the trading process, the higher is its impact. Wealth earned by a trading
strategy depends on the dividends payed by the assets selected. Therefore, dividends are one of
the driving forces for this process.
3.1 The fundamental allocation styles
The financial market is characterized by the set of K ≥ 2 available assets K and a given set
of basic allocation styles L = {λα, α ∈ A}, where A is a finite alphabet of cardinality |A| > 0
and ‖λα‖1 = 1. Imposing short-sale constraints, we require that λα > 0, which is to say that
λαk ≥ 0 and there is some k such that λαk > 0, i.e., we assume that each fundamental allocation
has positive demand in at least one asset.
Let ∆L denote the simplex spanned by L. Each strategy in ∆L on the market can be
represented as a convex combination of basic allocation styles λα, while the mixture may vary
over time:
λt :=
∑
α
α(t) λα, α(t) ≥ 0,
∑
α
α(t) = 1.
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Thus each strategy λt ∈ ∆L is uniquely represented by a vector (t) = (α(t))α. Then the
trajectory  =
(
(t)
)
t
can be regarded as a flow between basic allocation styles L. These flow
















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λβλβ
′
•
(t)
Figure 4: Simplex of strategies on the market. The strategy
mix on the market is represented by a point (t) ∈ ∆L
dynamics are thought to depend on some observable economic variable, denoted by x. This
trigger represents available information, externalities, or other observables of the market itself.
By a slight abuse of notation, we may also write
α(t) = α(xt)
to express the fact that the coefficient of λα is some given function of the trigger variable xt,
where α : Rn → [0, 1], for some n. Then the portion which is invested in asset k according to
allocation style α given xt is
λt,k =
∑
α
α(xt) λαk .
3.2 The basic value process
Let E = (K,L) be a finite financial market as described before. Uncertainty of the market is
represented as usual: (Ω,S,F), is a given probability space ( Ω the set of states, S a σ−algebra of
events, F some probability measure), which is equipped with some filtration S = [S0, ..,ST , ..].
We assume that the price process Q as well as the dividend process are stochastic processes
adapted to the filtration S in that for each t, Qt and Dt are random variables with respect to
(Ω,St). There are J different strategies on the market, where λit = (λit,k, k ∈ K) is the strategy
i ∈ I defined by
λit =
∑
α
iα(xt)λ
α.
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If wit is the wealth of the (individual) strategy i at time t, then the portfolio bought on the
market is θit =
(
θit,k, k ∈ K
)
, where, according to the strategy i,
θik,t =
λit,k w
i
t
Qt,k
,
and where Qt,k is the price of one unit of asset k on the market at time t. Note that we assume
that assets are infinitely divisible. This assumption is an acceptable approximation on a large
market.

•
• •
•
•
...

Qt−1 Qt Qt+1
θt−1 θt
















Dt Dt+1
Figure 5: Portfolio transformation in a time-discrete Multi-Period model, with short hand notation Dt+1 =
D[t,t+1) is the dividend payed during the interval [t, t + 1).
Time is partitioned into equally long, half-open intervals [t, t + 1), while trade happens only
in t while dividends are payed at the end of the period, i.e. Dt is the vector of dividend payed
during the period [t − 1, t). The state of a financial market at some time t is assumed to be
completely characterized by the vector of asset prices Qt and the vector of dividends Dt.
Assume that strategy i has some initial wealth wi0, which is completely invested into a
portfolio θi0 = (θ
i
k,0) defined by
θik,0 =
λi0,k
Q0,k
wi0.
The investment at time 0 therefore is Q0 θ
i
0 =
∑
k λ
i
0,k w
i
0 = w
i
0. Its payoff at the end of the
interval [0, 1) is D1, while its capital gain on the market at time 1 is Q1 θ
i
0. At time 1, a new
portfolio is bought for Q1 θ
i
1. The wealth w
i
t+1 at time t + 1 after reinvestment into the new
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portfolio θit+1 therefore is
wit+1 =
(
Dt+1 + Qt+1
)
θit −Qt+1θit+1
= Dt+1θit − Qt+1 θ˙
i
t,
where θ˙
i
t := θ
i
t+1 − θit. The entity Θt :=
∑
i θ˙
i
t can be considered as the vector of net trades,
while ‖Θt‖1 can be regarded as the volume traded.
We assume that all agents follow the same ”investment mode” characterized by
Qt+1θ˙
i
t+1 = 0 for all i. (1)
This assumption can be called self-financing, see also Appendix A. Under this assumption, the
wealth accumulation in the bank account belonging to strategy i yields wit+1 = Dt+1θ
i
t and thus
we obtain the fundamental evolution equation for this investment rule as
wit+1 = w
i
t
∑
k
Dkt+1
Qkt
λit,k. (2)
To normalize this expression, first define the total wealth collected by all strategies,
Wt+1 =
∑
k
Dkt+1St,k,
where St is the vector of exogenous supplies. One then obtains for the relative wealth rit :=
wit/Wt
rit+1 = r
i
t
∑
k
Dkt+1S
k
t∑
k′ D
k′
t+1St,k′
Wt
Skt Q
k
t
λit,k
= rit
∑
k
dkt+1
Wt
Qkt S
k
t
λit,k,
where dt+1 =
(
Dkt+1S
k
t∑
k′ D
k′
t+1St,k′
)
k
is the vector of relative dividends payed at time t+ 1. Note that
0 ≤ rit, while
∑
i r
i
t = 1. Let
Qkt :=
Wt
Skt
pkt ,
where pkt = p
k(Λt, rt) is the relative price of the kth asset, which may depend not only on the
demand for this asset but also on other factors. Then
rit+1 = r
i
t
(∑
k
dkt+1
pkt
λit,k
)
, (3)
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where ykt+1 := d
k
t+1/p
k
t can be regarded as the corresponding (relative) dividend yield.
1 Inserting
λit =
∑
α 
i
α(t)λ
α, we obtain
rit+1 = r
i
t
∑
α
iα(t)
〈
yt+1,λ
α
〉
,
where we define y =
(
y(α)
)
α
with yα :=
〈
yt+1,λ
α
〉
being the projection of the vector of relative
dividend yields on the allocation style λα, so that
rit+1 = r
i
t
∑
α
y
(α)
t+1 
i
α(t) = r
i
t
(
yt+1 Li(t)
)
,
where L(t) =
(
i(t)
)
i=1..I
is the matrix of strategies. Hence we obtain
rt+1 = rt 
(
yt+1 L(t)
)
,
where  denotes componentwise multiplication. Since ‖rt‖1 = 1 for all t, we have the condition
that
1 =
∑
α
rit y
α
t+1 
i
α(t) =
∑
i,k
dkt+1
rit λ
i
t,k
pkt+1
This condition implicitly determines possible pricing rules pkt (r, λ). One particular solution to
this equation is
pkt+1 =
∑
j
rjtλ
k
j . (4)
Due to equation (4) prices are weightened averages of the strategies on the market.
4 An elementary model of a market
To make things as simple as possible, we consider a complete financial market with only two
funds. According to our model, the market’s behavior is represented by strategies. Each strategy
can be regarded as a class of trading rules. The fundamental assumption is that the markets
behavior can be described by two (strategic) components: a time-constant or slow varying
component and a fast varying component. These two classes of strategies compete on the market
for wealth and so generate a price process. In contrast to Lux (1998), for example, we do not
consider a market as a multi-agent system, rather than study the behavior of the interplay of
two dynamical market components: a slow varying (adiabatic) one and a fast varying. As basic
allocation styles we choose the canonical one, i.e.,
λ1 =
(
1
0
)
, λ2 =
(
0
1
)
. (5)
1Often the term relative dividend yield is restricted to the situation where supply is normalized to 1.
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With respect to the canonical basis (5), the slow (constant) strategic component on the market
is represented by a simple strategy with parameter α
λM = αλ1 + (1− α)λ2,
while the dynamical strategic component is given by
λβ(t) = β(t)λ1 +
(
1− β(t)
)
λ2.
where 0 < (t) < 1 and β is some parameter, see below. In the following we also denote the
constant strategy by [α]. For (t) we make the following ansatz
β(t) = β(xt)
The corresponding strategy β(t) is also denoted by
(
β
)
in the following. We suppose that
the flow is generated by a trigger xt which is some function of the respective asset demands
ykt+1 = d
k
t /p
k
t+1. A particular simple trigger is the excess demand
xt = y1t+1 − y2t+1.
A potential choice for the strategy (β) is
β(xt) =
eβ xt
1 + eβ xt
, (6)
so that β(t) is a flow between λ1 and λ2. This particular form was chosen for the sake of
simplicity and may be economically motivated in terms of Prospect Theory, see Kahneman and
Tversky (1979). The graph of the function β is a sigmoid in the range [−∞,∞] and takes values
in [0, 1], while it is strictly increasing if β > 0 and strictly decreasing if β < 0. The parameter β
serves as a measure for the sensitivity with which the portfolio composition reacts to changes in
x in that ddxβ(x)
∣∣∣
x=0
= β4 . We therefore call β the elasticity of the strategy. x > 0 if asset 1 has
a higher return than asset 2. Therefore, given that β > 0, x > 0 leads to more demand for asset
1. The corresponding strategy (β), β > 0, can therefore be described as a strategy according
to which wealth flows towards the fund with the better performing asset. If β < 0, then the
strategy (β) is to buy the worse asset. Thus, the case β > 0 might be regarded as a simple
trend follower strategy, while the case β < 0 might be seen as a mean reverting strategy. Lux
and Marchesi (1999) studied a financial market as a large multi-agent system, in which agents
can follow different strategies, i.e. they are noise traders or fundamentalists. Noise traders may
rely on non-fundamental sources of information such as price trends. In our setting, a strategy
(β) with parameter β < 0 can be regarded as a fundamentalist’s strategy, while (β) with β > 0
can be regarded as a noise trader’s strategy relying on the idea of momentum reverting.
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5 Numerical estimates
Recall the finding displayed in Figure 3. There, distributions of real asset returns were assumed
to belong to the family of hyperbolic distributions with shape parameters (q, ξ). One sees that
the parameter range is quite small, q ≈ 0, and ξ ∈ [0.6, 1]. Thus the observed distribution is
nearly symmetric and ranges from a soft to a hard tent. Our model of a market can reproduce
this qualitative finding. Relative dividends are assumed to be uniformly distributed in (0, 1)
while d1t + d
2
t = 1 for all t, while the two strategies [α] and (β) are defined as above. For simu-
lation, we choose α < 1/2. The reason for choosing α 
= 1/2 is that in the simulated setup, the
strategy [1/2] would asymptotically dominate the market and thus would push out any different
strategy (β). This is an immediate consequence of a Theorem by Amir et. al (2005), which
states that – in this setting – the simple strategy [1/2] will asymptotically overtake the market
and thus prices become constant. Consequently for α = 1/2, the return distribution becomes
asymptotically a Dirac distribution with all its mass on 0. If α 
= 1/2, the second strategy can
coexist.
Figures 6-8 display the log return distributions for different parameters of the dynamical
strategy: α = 0.4 and β = 0.2, 0.4, 0.473. Each run has length 20,000, while the relative fre-
quencies are estimated for a sample set of size 500. Simulations suggest that there exists a
critical elasticity β∗ such that the distribution for |β∗| is Laplace, while for β < |β∗|, the graph
of the distribution is a soft tent and approaches a parabola for small β.
Figure 6: Semilogarithmic plot
of the return distribution for
[0.4], (+0.2)
Figure 7: Semilogarithmic plot
of the theoretical return distribution
for [0.4], (+0.4)
Figure 8: Semilogarithmic plot
of the return distribution for
[0.4], (+0.473)
Our simulations are compatible with the hypothesis by Madan and Seneta, who conjecture
that asset returns are hyperbolically distributed. In particular, we see that that the shape of
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the distribution depends on the parameters (α, β). More precisely, given parameter α, the log-
arithmic return distribution looks like a parabola for small β, while if β is increased, then the
graphs tends to a tent. The intuitive reason for this transition is the following: The larger the
elasticity β is, the higher is the probability for large returns. Therefore, the larger the elasticity
is, the more mass possess the tails in the distribution. This transition parallels the behavior of
the hyperbolic distribution for increasing shape parameter ξ, where the distribution for ξ = 1 is
a tent, while it is deformed into a parabola for ξ → 0. Thus we say the return distribution from
our model is qualitatively similar to an hyperbolic one.
Figure 9: Return trails for
{
[0.4], (0.4)
}
and the estimated kernel density (middle column) and also as a
semi-logarithmic plot (right column). Row 1 is for the simulated return trail, while row two is the time series of
the residuals obtained by correcting the original trails for volatility clustering.
The graphs in Figure 9 are for parameter values α = 0.4, β = 0.4. Our proposed model
is obviously not a GARCH stochastic process, although the simulated returns exhibit the same
type of volatility clustering as seen in real asset returns (and for which GARCH models can
affectively model and predict). The unconditional return distribution, displayed in the upper
left picture in Figure 9, shows the our elementary model exhibits pronounced volatility cluster-
ing, which is a standard feature of asset returns, and usually modelled with a GARCH process.
As such, it makes sense to examine not only the unconditional distribution of the generated
returns, but also their conditional distribution, for which we use a GARCH structure. In partic-
ular, we estimate a GARCH(1,1) model driven by iid hyperbolic disturbances. The parameters
of the GARCH recursion and the two hyperbolic shape parameters are jointly estimated via
maximum likelihood. For details on the stationarity conditions, computation, and performance
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of such models, see Mittnik and Paolella (2000). The conditional density of real asset data still
exhibits heavy tails, but which are less fat than those of the unconditional density. In fact,
the conditional distribution still is a tent-like graph, in the semi-logarithmic plot, and thus is
hyperbolic-like itself. Moreover, the two figures to the very right show that the tails of the
conditional distribution are less heavy than those of the unconditional distributions, as common
in GARCH applications with real financial data.
The main concern of this note was to give economic evidence for the empirically reasonable
conjecture that asset returns are hyperbolic-like distributed. We saw numerically that our
economic model produces return distributions which are strongly non-Gaussian and exhibits
semi-heavy tails and, thereby, even qualitatively resemble typical features common to the family
of hyperbolic distributions. Moreover the returns distributions generated by our elementary
model exhibit conditional heavy tails, i.e. after correcting for volatility clustering, the tails of
the conditional distribution are hyperbolic-like, but less fat than those of the unconditional one.
Returns have no significant autocorrelation for lags larger than 1, while simulated trails show
volatility clustering. Thereby the autocorrelation of absolute returns decays to zero rapidly.
Our model therefore reproduces important stylized facts derived from real asset data, while it
supports the conjecture that asset returns are hyperbolic-like distributed.
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